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	Questions about distributive justice can be taken to vary along at least two dimensions. On the one hand, we can look at distributive justice as something which operates on a variety of different scales: within particular local institutions, at the level of the state and (though this is controversial) at the level of the state. We can also distinguish between discussions which concern the question of how much (if anything) each individual is owed as a matter of justice, and questions about the kinds of institution which we might put in place in order to ensure that individuals receive what they deserve and (just as importantly), to take remedial action when they do not.

	For the purposes of this chapter, I shall be concerned with questions at the global and institutional level. In other words, I shall be concerned with questions about the kinds of institution which we might need to ensure an equitable distribution of the worlds resources, and with the duties that individuals have to support such institutions. In order to do so.  I shall deploy a concept which is deployed more rarely than it might be within political philosophy: that of collective obligation. With that in mind I shall proceed as follows: I shall start by saying something to motivate the idea that the idea of collective obligation might be useful in this context, and introduce one kind of collective obligation which I find particularly significant here: what I call global collective obligations. I shall then consider the ways in which obligations which fall on collectives are relevant to individuals, and in particular the ways on which they give rise to obligations falling on their members, focussing in particular on duties to support certain kinds of institution. Finally, I shall consider an objection to the line of thought which I have explored – namely that the principles that I have outlined might also give rise to an obligation to support unjust institutions, even when more just institutions are possible. 

	What I have to say will relate to broader discussions of international justice in at least three respects. First, the argument that I put forward for the existence of the kind of collective obligation I am interested in starts from considerations about the coherence of the idea that individuals have rights to certain kinds of basic necessities. Discussions of whether they do so, and of whether the notion of such a right is even coherent (as I shall claim it is) clearly fall within the domain of distributive justice. Secondly, I shall be arguing for the existence of a duty (falling on individuals) to support certain kinds of institution involved in the distribution of  goods. Since these duties arise out of consideration of the rights of others we should see them as duties of distribtuive justice. Finally, my argument will be an argument about how a certain kind of moral burden which falls on all of us collectively should be shared out among  the various members of the world's population, it is in that respect as well an argument about justice in distribution.​[1]​        

II: Collective Obligation as a Key Notion in Political Philosophy
It is natural to think that political philosophy is concerned with reflection on some of the ways in which groups of  human beings come together to confront together the problems that they face together: in other words, with the domain  of collective action. From this point of view it might seem surprising that the notion of collective obligation rarely assumes centre-stage within the subject. If there are, or can be, collective obligations, then these must surely be constraints on the kinds of collective action in which we may permissibly engage in. Indeed,  one might even suspect that considerations about collective obligations ought to play a central role in demarcating the form that any legitimate form of political organization ought to take.  
One significant obstacle to giving the notion of collective obligation a central role   in normative theorizing  about the political domain is the apparent obscurity, in many situations, of the relationship between claims about collective responsibility and any constraints or requirements that they might impose on the actions of individuals.​[2]​ This point is often made in connection with discussions of backward-looking judgments about collective responsibility. Suppose the citizens of the United Kingdom, bear, collectively, some sort of responsibility for the policies pursued by its government overseas, and in particular for its participation in illegal acts of war in Iraq. It is at best somewhat unclear what responsibility lies with particular individuals who might have opposed that war, actively and strenuously; those who voted for parties which did not support the war; those who reached the age of adulthood while the war was being conducted, and so on.​[3]​ 
Similar points can be made about forward-looking political obligation: we may decide that the present population of the planet has, taken collectively, an obligation to do what it can to mitigate the effects of world-wide climate change. We might disagree about what, if anything, such an obligation requires of a citizen of a historically under-developed country; an American teenager; a Norwegian Old Age Pensioner and the lone parent of a developmentally-disabled child. 
I have claimed that politics is and political philosophy should be concerned with collective action. Someone might infer from this that political philosophers should not regard it as especially significant that the implications of a claim about collective responsibility for the actions of individuals can be somewhat unclear. However, this response seems unduly relaxed.  Even if  political questions typically take the form ‘What should/can/must/we do’, there is still a sense in which the question ‘’What should/can/must I do’ is more fundamental.’ ‘We’ can do nothing, without some ‘I’ or some ‘I’s doing something. So if we want to give the notion of collective obligation a central role within political philosophy we should not neglect its implications for questions about individual  action and individual obligation.   This paper is intended as a contribution to the task of clarifying some of the connections that exist between collective and individual obligations. In particular, I shall be concerned with what  I  have elsewhere called ‘global collective obligations’ and their implications for the ways in which  individuals ought to organize themselves on an institutional level.​[4]​ I shall argue that some kinds of forward-looking global obligation give rise to obligations on individuals to bring into existence institutions which can enable those obligations to be met. 
III: Global Collective Obligations: The Very Idea 
For the purposes of this paper, I shall assume that the notion of a collective obligation is at least coherent.​[5]​ Even if we take this for granted, however, If the notion of a collective obligation is coherent, then it is important to ask what kinds of groups might be the subjects of collective obligations. One obvious kind of candidate is entities which have a formal organizational structure, such as. nation-states, business corporations and smaller bodies such as committees within a larger organization.​[6]​ We should expect that in cases such as this the relationship  between  the obligations which fall on the group  and those which fall on individual members of that group will be complex and will depend on a number of different features both of the group concerned, and of the details of the relationship between individual group members and the group as a whole. 
Elsewhere I  have argued that groups which do not possess a formal structure of this sort can also be the subject of collective obligations.​[7]​ One unstructured collective which is of particular interest in this context is  the collective consisting of everyone currently alive, or what one might call the ‘global  collective.’  There are good reasons for thinking that there are morally significant obligations which fall on this collective.​[8]​ 
The argument for this conclusion starts from a well-known objection to the notion of subsistence rights, which he conceives of as rights on the parts of individuals to have certain basic needs attended to. One standard objection to the claim that such rights exist is that if they did, they would necessarily  give rise to obligations on agents to see to it that such needs are fulfilled (or, more plausibly to see to it that individuals acquire the capacity to meet these needs). However there seem to be cases in which it seems implausible to hold that such an obligation could fall either on any individual human being or on any salient collective body. 
Consider for example the case of a starving individual in a drought-stricken region of a failed state such as Somalia. It may be quite implausible to think that any particular individual has an obligation to do something about her fate: everyone nearby  who is in a position to help may be in a similar plight. It may also be true that the most obvious collective bodies are in no position to help either (that is the point of focusing on an individual in a failed state). The state in question may lack the resources, the organizational capacity, or the territorial control which would be required to do anything about their situation.​[9]​
It would be unsatisfactory to say that individuals in such circumstances do not have the rights that more fortunately placed individuals - for example, those who are in a position to be helped by their compatriots – do have. To say so would be to say in effect that the protection that rights are supposed to afford individuals lapses in situations where they are most in need of it.​[10]​ This unsatisfactory conclusion can be avoided if we think that obligations can fall on a global collective.​[11]​ The global collective body acts as what one might call an ‘obligation-bearer of last resort’. The existence of collective obligations which fall on this body is thus something which can be taken to be a presupposition of the claim that there is a right to have certain kinds of basic needs met. What we have is, in effect, a transcendental argument for the existence of obligations falling on a relatively unstructured body – namely a global collective. 
IVII: A Problem - The Agency Objection
One might object to this argument by denying that  that any relatively unstructured group can be the subject of collective obligations. Call this the Agency Objection. The Agency Objection rests on a substantive claim about the kinds of entities on which collective obligations can fall: namely that they must be collective agents. Call this the Agency Claim. The Agency Claim is a substantive claim, which we should  not accept it without argument. ​[12]​
Here is an argument in favour of the Agency Claim. Call it the ‘Agency Argument’.
(Agency Argument)
(P1) Only groups with a certain kind of internal structure are capable of collective action 
(P2). Only groups that are capable of collective action can have collective obligations
(C)	Unstructured groups cannot be the subject of collective obligation.
We should not accept the Agency Objection. As I shall argue in a moment, the Agency Argument does not give us good reasons for accepting the Agency Claim, since both of its premises are questionable (and, in this context, contentious). And there do not seem to be any other good reasons for accepting the Agency Claim.
The first premiss of the Agency Argument  is problematic because the phenomenon of collective action has been analyzed in different ways by different authors. While it is true that on some accounts of collective action, collective action requires an agent with a certain amount of internal structure, there are other accounts, such as Christopher Kutz’s ‘minimalist’ account according to which this is not so.​[13]​ In the absence of detailed argument about the nature of collective action we cannot simply make an inference from lack of formal structure to the incapacity for agency.
(We might wonder whether apparently competing accounts of collective action are in fact competing accounts of the same phenomenon, or whether they are accounts of different, but closely related phenomena.​[14]​ In the latter case, then in the absence of an argument for the view that collective obligations require a capacity for collective action of one particular sort rather than another, it would be tendentious to insist that collective obligations can only fall on groups which are capable of performing collective action of  a particular sort. But this, it seems is what would be required in order to establish that collective obligations could only fall on groups with a particular structure.) 
The second premises of the argument is also problematic. Several authors, including Isaacs, Collins and Lawford-Smith appear to take it to be self-evident.​[15]​ However, it is not. Indeed, in this context it is  highly contentious. For, as I argue elsewhere, the existence of collective obligations does not require that the collective on whom the obligation falls be an agent but only  that some agent or agents be answerable for the fulfillment or non-fulfillment of the obligation.​[16]​ In the case of obligations which fall on unstructured groups, the agents in question are typically some or all of those who make up the group in question.​[17]​
	One might wonder whether the second premises of the argument follows from the claim that ‘Ought implies Can’. This suggestion would follow from the principle that ought implies can if we accepted the claim that only agents have the capacity to carry out the actions which are necessary for a collective obligations to be fulfilled. However, if we think that some collectives are potentially agents without actually being agents, then this claim seems false. For it seems plausible that if a collective is a potential agent has the capacity to do any of the things which it would have the capacity to do if it were appropriately organized. ​[18]​ (The general principle here involved is that if I am capable of acquiring the capacity to do X by a certain time, then, in the only sense of can which is of interest here, I can do it. It is in this sense, for example, that one might judge that the students who are being taught by a particular teacher can pass the final exam which she devised at the beginning of the semester, and that those who are in receipt of a scholarship stand under a moral obligation to do so.)  
IV: Connecting Individual and Collective Organizations
 It is not immediately clear what bearing the existence of a global obligation to satisfy subsistence needs might have on questions about what particular individuals should do in particular concrete situations. It is clear that such an obligation cannot give rise to an obligation on each individual to satisfy everyone’s subsistence needs. For no individual can do this. Indeed, the fact that no individual can do this, taken together with the claim that ought implies can, is precisely what supports the claim that there is a global collective obligation to be considered here in the first place. 
However, it does not follow from this that global obligations can give rise to no obligations on individuals.​[19]​ his would be to overlook the possibility that collective obligations can give rise to obligations on individuals that are slightly more complex than those which we have considered so far.  I have argued elsewhere that collective obligations can give rise to individual obligations without being reducible to them. In particular, I have defended the following claim:
(C to I)
If in a particular situation a collective C has an all-out obligation to Phi, then, for any 	member 	M of C, and for any set S of possible actions of members of C that, if 	performed together, 	would constitute C’s Phi-ing, if S includes M’s doing A, then M has a 	pro tanto obligation to do 	A. ​[20]​ 
(Roughly speaking, what C to I says is that if there is some way for members of a collectvie to act which will ensure the collective of which they are a member will do the thing it is obliged to do , then each of the mebers has a pro tanto obligation to act in that way) 
It is worth noticing that C to I is a principle connecting all-out collective obligations with pro tanto obligations on individuals. David Copp has argued in a number of recent publications that there are no plausible principles that will enable us to derive all-out obligations on individuals  from all-out obligations on collectives. But his arguments do not touch the principle which I have defended. ​[21]​  
For reasons of space I shall not attempt to rehearse the argument for C to I here. Instead I shall try to show that if we accept C to I,  we can derive from it  two further principles, which are somewhat more concrete in their implications for individuals  
(Organizational Principle 1)  
OP 1:  A stringent obligation which falls on a collective, and which can only be fulfilled by collective action of a sort that is unlikely to come about in a spontaneous and uncoordinated manner generates an obligation on each of the members of that collective to promote modes of organization that would enable the obligation to be carried out, to the extent that it is in their power to promote such forms of obligation . 
(Organizational Principle 2) 
OP 2: A stringent obligation which falls on a collective which is organized in such a way as to enable the co-ordination of collective actions that satisfy global obligations generates a pro tanto  obligation on individuals who form part of that collective to act in ways which are necessary for the fulfillment of those obligations.
    	 Clearly both these principles require considerable explication. For example, much more needs to be said about which obligations are ‘stringent obligations’ and why both principles are restricted  to the case of stringent obligations.  The occurrence of the notion of a stringent obligation in these principles will also make a difference to the question of what counts as an  adequate argument for them. Any such argument will at a minimum have to explain why it only applies to stringent obligations; ideally it should also say something about whether there are any related principles which apply to non-stringent obligations.   
The intuitive case for the restricting the principles in some way is fairly obvious: there would be something wrong with a principle that generated, or threatened to generate, a need for a world state – or even a loose federation of states – out of a possible collective obligation to avoid littering sidewalks. The word stringent acts, to that extent as something of a place-holder. However, I shall take an obligation to be stringent provided that failing to meet it would result a large number of significant violations of individuals basic rights, where I use the term basic right in Henry Shue’s sense to mean a right which individuals must have in order for any further assignment of rights to them to have any point.​[22]​  
This characterization of stringency still leaves the content of OP1 and OP2 somewhat indeterminate. Further specification would involve discussion of which rights are basic rights; of what counts as a ‘significant’ violation of them; and how many such violations are required to generate a stringent obligation. These are all important issues, which I shall not pursue for the time being. Even when these lacunae are acknowledged, it seems plausible that a good argument for OP1 and OP2 would go some way towards showing how claims about global obligation might give rise to relatively contentful requirements for action relating to particular individuals.​[23]​ 
OP 1 and OP 2 do not give rise to putative obligations on individuals which those individuals  are unable to satisfy. Furthermore they do appear to be capable of providing some kind of guidance concerning the ways in which particular  individuals should act in particular concrete circumstances. 
VI: Deriving  OP 1 and OP 2
I have claimed that OP 1 and OP 2 follow from C to I. But I have not provided any argument in favour of this claim.  I shall now attempt to remedy this lacuna.
OP 1 talks about situations where a collective has an obligation which is extremely unlikely to be met by spontaneous action on the part of its members. Furthermore, if collective obligations are constrained by the principle that ought implies can, then such obligations can be met by some combination of actions. If the obligations cannot be met by spontaneous action,  and can be met in some way, then the way they can be met is, presumably, by means of organized action. But organization of the required sort does not come out of nowhere: it needs to be put in place by the action of individuals. So if a collective can only solve a problem by acting in an organized manner, it can only solve that problem by doing what is required to organize itself in the requisite manner.
To say this is to say that if a collective has a duty which it cannot fulfill without organized action, then the ways in which it can meet that obligation involve organizing itself in a way that enable it to meet that obligation.​[24]​ If there is a duty on the individuals that make up the collective to act in ways which would enable them to fulfill the obligation, and these ways involve organizing themselves in particular ways then, according to C to I  they have a pro tanto  duty  to organize themselves in these ways. But  this is what  OP 1 says. 
I have said that collectives that are unlikely to be able to meet their obligations in virtue of the spontaneous actions of individuals who make up the collective may be able to meet them by organizing themselves. One might wonder whether this is the only possibility. In principle it seems as though it might not be. A collective might acquire the sort of organization required for meeting its obligations not by organizing itself, but by having some form of organization imposed on it from outside. This possibility is clearly irrelevant to the main kind of case that I have in mind here – that of the global collective, for in that case there is ex hypothesi nothing outside the collective which could impose the requisite form of organization on it. It is certainly possible to imagine situations involving other unorganized collectives are concerned where the necessary form of organization might be imposed from the outside. Suppose that the citizens of a nation comprehensively defeated in war have a collective obligation to institute scome form of order which will perform the basic functions of a state (as one might hold, of the people of Germany in 1945).​[25]​ It may be that in some situations the required kind of order is likeliest to come through being externally imposed.
This possibility is clearly irrelevant to the main kind of case that I have in mind here – that of the global collective, for in that case there is ex hypothesi nothing outside the collective which could impose the requisite form of organization on it. However, its bare possibility might be thought to throw some doubt on the argument I have given for OP 2. I do not think it should. Nevertheless, iIn general the chances of some external body imposing on a collective body just the forms of organization that it need to fulfill its collective obligations (as opposed to serving the interests of those who are imposing that form of order) seems small enough to be discounted. It may be optimistic, but it does not seem to be unduly optimistic to suppose that in general unstructured collective bodies are more likely to meet their obligations by finding their own form of obligation than by having some form of obligation imposed upon them from outside   
OP 2 is more complicated. However, in most cases where a collective is organized in such a way as to enable an obligation to be met, it seems likely that the way in which the obligation is most likely to be met will involve the individuals acting in accordance with the forms of organization that already exist and which would enable them to meet the obligations. (It need not be the only way: perhaps the institutions we have are sufficient to enable us to fulfill a certain duty, but are  not the only ones which could enable us to do so.) Changing forms of organization is complicated, time-consuming and unpredictable: in most cases obligations which could be met by a changed form of organization are less likely to be met in that way. So in most cases a pro tanto duty to  act in accordance with existing organizations to meet given collective obligations will not be outweighed by a competing and incompatible duty to come up with other forms of organization.
I noted in section IV that OP 1 and OP2 were stated in terms of ‘stringent’ collective obligations (and I also noticed a concomitant argumentative burden of explaining why this should be so). Nothing in the argument that I have given so far provides such an explanation. In fact the argument seems to justify much more inclusive principles, applying to all collective obligations, and not merely to stringent ones. This might even be taken as an objection to the arguments: the objection would be that if the arguments given are correct, our collective obligations give rise to too many obligations on individuals to be plausible.




In section V I gave an argument for two principles concerning the obligations of individuals to support international arrangements. I now wish to consider an objection to OP 2. The substance of the objection is that OP 2 is unduly conservative. It is conservative insofar as it directs us to support existing  institutions insofar as they are capable  of allowing us to satisfy our global obligations rather than, for example, devoting our energies to bringing about new forms of organisation. But is it arguably too conservative if it requires us to support institutional arrangments which are themselves unjust. 
It is worth distinguishing between fourthree different questions which we might want to consider here. The first is whether OP 2 could conceivably require us to support unjust institutional structures – whether it would require us to support them in some possible world or other. A second is whether OP 2 would require us to support unjust institutional structures in the world as it actually is. And a third question is whether either of these two possibilities would constitute  grounds for rejecting OP 2, and hence the line of argument which supports it. 
	I shall start by considering the last of these questions. One might think that if there are any circumstances at all in which OP 2 would give us a duty  to support unjust institutions thean this would give us compelling grounds for rejecting OP 2. And it seems at least possible to imagine, in a philosophical fantasy that there might be such grounds. Suppose it turns out that we have good reasons to think that there is a global collective obligation to prevent irreversible climate change of a sort which will have catastrophic implications for unborn generations. We can certainly imagine circumstances in which the institutions which exist and which are capable of averting such a threat might be ones which engaged in practices which were obviously unjust, such as extracting forced labour  from randomly chosen citizens. 

	Does this fact alone establish that OP 2 is unacceptable.unacceptable ? I am not convinced it does. There are two reasons why not. One is that is it is simply not clear that it is a requirement on principles of jsuticejustice that they should yield intuitively acceptable results in all possible situations. Perhaps there are predicaments that are sufficiently far removed from our own that we are simply not very good at6 figuring out what would be the right thing to do in them. If there are, then the fact that a putative principle yields intuitively unacceptable results in them should not count against the principle. Perhaps our intuitive sense of what would be right and wrong in such a situation is misleading in ways which would become apparent to us if we ever face such a situation, but which are difficult to get a senbse of when we are simply imagining a fairly sparsely described philosophical thought experiment.   

	The second reason why the fact that OP 2 might ground an obligation to support unjust institutions in some possible circumstances is that OP 2 only gives us prima facie reasons to support certain kinds of institutional structure. It is consistent with this that the fact that the institutions in question were extremely unjust might conceivably give us reasons for not supporting such institutions which outweighed  those prima facie reasons. If that were the case we would not have shown that OP 2 had any obviously unacceptable consequences even in these counterfactual circumstances.

	For these reasons it seems more sensible to concentrate on the question of whether OP 2 gives us an obligation to support unjust institutions in the actual world, and whether a positive answer to this question would provide reasons for finding OP 2 dubious. Here the news is less good. For it is at least possible to argue that OP 2 requires us to support unjust institutions in the actual world. And if this is true, it is much harder to argue that the fact that OP 2 has intuitively unacceptable consequences is unimportant.          


	Let us consider the first of these points first. Thomas Pogge has argued that world poverty involves the violation of the human rights – including, importantly, the liberty rights, of a large proportion of the world's poor.. In particular, he argues that the current international economic framework, incorporating as it does such things as state sovereignty privileges, plays an important role in allowing these rights to be violated. ( I focus on the passive here, rather than the fact that on Pogge's view that we are actively involved in violating these rights, because I am interested in questions about institutional frameworks.) But it is entirely consistent with this that the existing economic system should be one  which is capable of allowing for political action to address, say our global obligation to see that the subsistence rights of all human beings are met. If this is true, then OP 2 would give us reason to support an unjust institutional order in the actual  world. This seems like a substantial and serious objection. 

	The objection might be mitigated to some extent by considerations to which I have drawn attention when considering whether OP 2 might have unacceptable consequences in some other possible world. At that point I drew attention to the fact that OP 2 only gave rise to a prima facie duty to support certain kinds of institution; and I suggested that there might be countervailing obligations not to participate in unjust institutions which would outweigh this prima facie duty. However, this response is liable to seem somewhat thin when we are considering the implications of OP 2 for our actually existing institutions. It is natural to think that in this situation we would like to have some idea of what this countervailing duty might be. In the final section of my paper I address this issue.       

VIII: How to Develop Institutions

	I have argued that there are global collective obligations, that these obligations give rise to prima faice obligations on individuals to institute and promote forms of global organisation which would enable these global collective obligations to be met, and that this prima facie obligation is likely to give us an obligation to support institutional frameworks which actually exist, even if these frameworks are ones which, in practice, enable substantial injustice. I have also argued that the unattractive aspect of this view which I highlighted in the previous section might be mitigated to some extent if there were some kind of countervailing duty which could over-ride it. 

	At this point, then, three things seem necessary. The first is to say something about what this countervailing duty might be; the second would be to explain why we should think that such a duty exists; and the third would be to say something more detailed about the ways in which this kind of duty might interact with the problematic parts of OP 2.  

	Let us say something about the content of the duty first. We should notice that OP 2 says that we have a prima facie duty to support institutional frameworks which would enable our collectviecollective global obligations to be met. But the word 'support' is very non-specific: there are many different ways in which one can support an institution; or rather, there are many different activities that could count as forms of support. (To the extent that I pay my taxes and shop in supermarkets, I am arguably thereby suppoorting the existing international political and economic system. But there are other things which I could do which would make my support more or less whole-hearted.) We should also notice that institutions of all sorts are not static arrangements: they are constantly subject to forces that lead them to develop in one way rather than another. Furthermore, it is arguable that in order for any existing set of institutions to actualise its capacity for meeting our collective obligations it would need to develop, and to develop in some ways rather than others.   

	This means that OP 2 would be compatible with the existence of a further obligation – namely an obligation to develop institutions in ways which make them more, rather than less just. If there is  such an obligation, we should probably think of it as being  something like a Kantian 'imperfect duty' – one  where  we have a certain amount of discretion about how and to what extent we are going to fulfilfulfill it. It would surely be absurd to think that each of us should be responsible for promoting the development of all the institutions in which they participate in the direction of greater justice. However, even an imperfect duty of this sort would seem to be enough to mitigate the problematic aspects of OP 2.

	But do we have such a duty? We might  think that it would be unacceptably ad hoc to infer from the fact that the existence of a duty of this sort would make an otherwise  problematic position intuitively more acceptable. So one might hope that the duty in question could be inferred from some kind of higher level principle – perhaps even form the principles connecting global and individual obligations which I appealed to in  section V.  Unfortunately, it is hard to see  any reason for thinking this is true.  

	Instead, I think we should question the idea that supposing that a  duty of this sort exists is indeed ad hoc. Arguably, it is not less ad hoc than  the line of thought which underlay the initial objection. The idea that there would be something problematic about supporting unjust instituions even if they were institutions  which could enable us to satisfy our global obligations must be based on something.  It is not something we simply have a brute intellectual compulsion to believe. If it were , there would be no way of articulating the force of the intuition to someone who did not share it  - as  we are presumably inclined to think we can.

	What, then might such a line of thought be based on? The answer is, presumably, that by participating in such institutions we would be causing certain kinds of harm. If this  is correct, we might ask what kinds of obligation we have around harms that we cause.  One which  stands out in this context is an obligation not to cause harm, where that is avoidable. But there are certainly cases where we may cause harm, because something else we have an obligation to do cannot be achieved without it. In such cases other obligations arise: obligations to mitigate or make amends for the harms   we cause. In the light of this I suggest, albeit tentatively, that we take our duty to promote just developments in the institutions in which we participate  to derive from a much more general  duty to mitigate  harms  in which we are implicated   when we act in ways which are necessary for us to meet the obligations which we have.​[26]​
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^1	 	  I am grateful to Stephen Snyder for emphasising this point to me in correspondence
^2	 	 Other reasons, which I shall not discuss here might include the suspicion that the notion of collective obligation is incoherent and the idea that claims about collective obligation are in some sense reducible to claims about individual obligation. For further discussion see SELF-IDENTIFYING REFERENCE OMITTEDWringe 2006, 2010, 2014
^3	 	 On the other hand, while the relationship between collective responsibility and individual responsibility may be obscure, it is not, and is not generally though to be,  non-existent:  it would go against the judgment of many involved in such protests to say that they bore no responsibility for the actions of their government; and it would make little sense of many people’s view that as citizens of a country engaged in an illegal war, they bore a special responsibility for stopping it.
^4	 	 Wringe 2006, 2010a
^5	 	For some influential defenses of the claim, see French 1984, May 1987, Copp 2006, Pettit 2007 Isaacs 2011. For my own views see Wringe 2006, 2010a, and forthcoming
^6	 	  See Gilbert 2008, French 1984, and Copp 2006 respectively for examples of each of these sorts. 
^7	 	 Wringe forthcoming, 2010, 2006. Cf also Isaacs 2011 chapters 1, 2 and 5,
^8	 	 Wringe 2006. Cf Nussbaum 2006, who has also suggested  that we should think of certain requirements of justice as giving rise to global obligations. It is worth noting that n Not everyone would accept that the population of the world does constitute an unstructured collective of the sort the WringeI suggests in his 2006 articlehere. One reason for this has been explored in detail by Pogge (Pogge 2001) who suggests that global economic interconnectedness makes the world’s population part of a structured political community. Whether or not  Pogge is correct, I think the argument from the nature of rights suggests that it  makes sense to think of there being collective obligations on the world’s population considered in abstraction from any political structure that might fall on them (just as it might make sense to think of a group of individuals who were in fact the members of a particular club or social group having certain obligations when considered as a particular social organized group, and other obligations in virtue of some other form of social organization, or in virtue of their being placed in such a way as to enable them to act together collectively to address some pressing need. For further discussion of Pogge’s view see Meckled-Garcia 2008, Wringe 2010b   
^9	 	 O’Neill 1986/1998. For useful discussion see also Griffin 2008. Sreenivasan 2012 has recently appealed to an argument along similar lines in defence of the claim that there is no human right to health.
^10	 	 Of course the protection that rights provide is only metaphorical. Rights can only protect individuals to the extent that individuals act in accordance with the obligations that those rights generate. But what would be entailed by the suggestion that people in desperate circumstances have fewer rights is not this uncontroversial claim, but that these individuals would be deprived of the protections which rights can, and should, provide.
^11	 	 See  Wringe 2006 for arguments that this is the best way of avoiding the conclusion; and in particular that collective obligations falling on other bodies provide a less satisfactory solution.  
^12	 	Isaacs 2011 chapter 1, Lawford-Smith 2012  and Collins (forthcoming)  all endorse the claim that  only collectives which are capable of agency can be the subjects of collective obligation. For an argument against this view see Wringe 2010a 
^13	 	 List and Pettit 2011 French 1984, Gilbert 1989 Kutz 2000a b
^14	 	 Cf Gilbert 2002(REF)
^15	 	   Isaacs 2011, Lawford-Smith 2012, Collins 2013
^16	 	 Wringe 2010a
^17	 	Wringe 2010a
^18	 	 Lawford Smith (2012) has argued that this is not the case: she suggests that in general  an unorganised	 group does not have the capacity to do things which it  could do if organised, simply because it may be 	so difficult for the group to organise itself. She cites in connection with this case the German army under 	Hitler which (she claims) did not have the capacity to bring Hitler down even though it could have done 	so if appropriately organised. Her reason for denying this is to exempt the army (considered as a 	collective) from blame in this context. However, it is not clear to me that Lawford-Smith draws the right 	lesson from this example: it seems just as plausible to hold that the army as an instituion was culpable 	even though, perhaps, no individual serving in it was (since they were, she claims, not in a position to be 	reasonably sure that others would have co-operated with them). One reason that it might make sense to 	do so would be that one could regard the structure or character of the German army as being to blame in 	this case. Doing so helps to make sense of certain kinds of reactive attitude that one might have in this 	case:  for example one might  think that the army desreved contempt, while reserving judgment on	 whether any particular individuals did.    
^19	 	My interest at this point is in what, in principle, individuals would have to do in order to fulfil the collective obligations which fall upon groups of which they are a member. It is a separate, and important question, and one which I have addressed as to whether they are capable of doing so, and in particular, how we ought to understand claims of collective capacity in this context. See in particular Wringe 2010, and for further critical discussion of the view I put forward there, Pinkert 2014, Lawford-Smith 2015
^20	 	 This formulation of C to I owes a great deal to useful correspondence with David Copp POTENTIALLY IDENTIFYING REFERENCE OMITTED (though he should not be blamed for  the formulation I have settled on)  
^21	 	For further discussion see Wringe (forthcoming)
^22	 	  Shue (1980/1996) Shue argues - correctly in my view – that such rights must include both rights to a basic level of subsistence and to a certain level of personal security. For further discussion, see Beitz and Goodin 2009.
^23	 	It is worth emphasizing that I shall be providing arguments in favour of OP1 and OP2, I shall not be claiming that the provide us with the full story about the ways in which global obligations might filter down to the individual level. One reason for this is that OP 2 fails to generate any obligations on individuals in situations where there is more than one way for a collective to carry out its collective obligations - as will often be the case. Nevertheless, a successful argument for them would at least show how claims about global obligation might give rise to substantive claims about the obligations of individuals. 
^24	 	 Or perhaps acquiescing in having such a form of organization imposed upon it: see below.
^25	 	 Wringe 2010a. Thanks to my colleague Lars VinxCOLLEAGUE 1 for suggesting this example. 
^26	 	I am indebted to Stephen Snyder for helpful comments and to both Stephen Snyder and Manuel Knoll for their patience in awaiting a revfised version of my original paper.
